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Abstract
We propose a dynamic model to describe a shery where both preys and predators are harvested
by a population of shermen who are allowed to catch only one of the two species at a time. According
to the strategy currently employed by each agent, i.e. the harvested variety, at each time period the
population of shermen is partitioned into two groups, and an evolutionary mechanism regulates how
agents dynamically switch from one strategy to the other in order to improve their prots. Among
the various dynamic models proposed, the most realistic is a hybrid system formed by two ordinary
dierential equations, describing the dynamics of the interacting species under shing pressure, and an
impulsive variable that evolves in a discrete time scale, in order to describe the changes of the fraction
of shermen that harvest a given stock. The aim of the paper is to analyze the economic consequences
of this kind of self-regulating shery, as well as its biological sustainability, in comparison with other
regulatory policies. Our analytic and numerical results give evidence that in some cases this kind of
myopic, evolutionary self-regulation might ensure a satisfactory trade-o between prot maximization
and resource conservation.
Keywords: Fisheries management; Heterogeneous agents; Interacting populations; Evolutionary
game theory; Hybrid dynamical systems.
1 Introduction
The exploitation of unregulated open access sheries is characterized by a typical prisoner dilemma,
often referred to as the 'tragedy of the commons' after [1]. As a consequence, individuals maximize
short-term prots instead of pursuing long-term objectives with overexploitation of the resource and
economic ineciency, i.e. lower levels of resource and prots in the long run.
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Indeed, the sustainability of sheries exploitation is constrained by the natural stocks growth as
well as equilibrium patterns regulated by ecological interactions among species. Adding harvesting
activity to such a complex (typically non linear) dynamical system opens scenarios which are not
easy to be understood and managed. Moreover, the overexploitation of some sh stocks may have
consequences for the whole ecosystem which are dicult to be forecasted, and may eventually lead
to depletion of some species, and thus decreasing yields, up to the danger of unexpected extinction
of resources. For these reasons, central institutions usually enforce forms of regulation either by
imposing harvesting restrictions, such as constant eorts, individual shing quotas, taxations, or by
limiting the kinds of sh to be caught or the regions where exploitation is allowed (see e.g. [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6]). Due to the peculiar issue, dierent sources of strategic interdependence among exploiters
are present, as pointed out in [4], [5], [6], [7]. First, biological externalities must be taken into
account, as overexploitation of the resource by some agents may have severe repercussions on the
capacity of regeneration of the resource, thus giving a negative externality for the whole community
of exploiters. Second, market externalities may exist, due to price reduction as a consequence of
increasing harvesting, and nally cost externalities, due to the increase of harvesting costs when sh
stock is depleted. On the basis of these self-regulating economic externalities, some experiments
on endogenous regulatory policies have been recently performed, in which central authorities only
establish some general rules and then shermen are allowed to decide their shing strategies according
to short-period prot maximization arguments. For example, a recent law proposed in Italy to regulate
the harvesting of two non interacting shellshes (Venerupis aurea and Callista chione) in the Adriatic
Sea, imposes that during a given time period (three years) each agent can harvest only one species,
possibly revising the choice in predened successive periods. In other words, instead of imposing a
dicult-to-control policy (e.g. imposed eort, total allowable catch, etc.), the central authority just
establishes that each vessel can harvest just a single kind of sh and has to stick to this choice for a
given time interval. A rst analysis of this model with two independent species has been carried out
in [8].
Along these ideas, in this paper we propose, as an exercise, a dynamic model to describe a situation
where exploiters can harvest two dierent species which interact through a prey-predator relationship.
According to the employed strategy, i.e. the target species, at each time the population of shermen
is partitioned into two groups. We rst study the dynamics of the system in which these two groups
do not change over time. Then, we introduce an evolutionary mechanism (replicator dynamics) based
on the observed prots, which regulates how agents dynamically switch from one strategy to another.
First we discuss the case in which this switching can take place continuously. Then we address the
case of a discrete-time switching of the harvesting strategy (due to regulatory or logistic constraints).
Although discrete-time replicator models are know to generate more complicated behaviors in
comparison with their continuous-time counterparts (see for instance [9]), we do not discretize the prey-
predator model because it is typically expressed in continuous time in biological modeling. Instead
we embed the discrete replicator (decision driven) in a standard continuous-time model. In this case
the model becomes a hybrid dynamical systems, i.e. a dynamical systems evolving in continuous time
with some variables allowed to change at discrete times; moreover, these impulsive changes take place
according to an endogenous switching mechanism. Hybrid dynamical systems are widely employed to
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describe engineering, biological and medical systems (see e.g. [10], [11], [12], [13]) and can also be of
great interest in economic science.
The aim of the paper is to analyze, by analytical and numerical methods, the economic conse-
quences of this kind of self-regulating shery, as well as to shed some light on the sustainability of
this form of exploitation in comparison to other policies. In the evolutionary game literature, it is
well documented that common pool resource games can lead to overexploitation (or even extinction)
when the Nash (myopic) strategy is played over time (see [14], [7]). However, here we show that the
system could self-regulate even with the lack of cooperative behavior in the population of harvesters
as a consequence of multi-species targets and economic and biological externalities. Indeed, our anal-
ysis gives evidence of possible advantages of prot-driven self regulated harvesting strategy choices
over other practices, both from the point of view of biomass levels (i.e. biological sustainability) and
prots (economic sustainability). Even far from the real system we aim at describing, the cases of
nonevolutionary dynamics and evolutionary switching in continuous time provide useful suggestions
about the directions of investigation for the more realistic hybrid system, as well as some intuitive
interpretations of the properties observed through numerical simulation. Moreover, the simulation
results suggest that this kind of myopic evolutionary regulation could in some cases ensure a virtuous
trade-o between prot maximization and resource conservation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 the prey-predator model is dened and the three
harvesting functions employed in the paper are described: 1) imposed constant eort; 2) unrestricted
harvesting; and 3) restricted harvesting; in the latter, the regulator only imposes that each agent is
allowed to harvest one species at a time whereupon agents are free to decide their catch. In section
3 we study the dynamics of the prey-predator model with the various harvesting functions previously
obtained, whereas in section 4 we analyze the evolutionary models both with continuous and discrete
switching times. Numerical simulations of the dynamic equations described in sections 3 and 4 are
compared in section 5. Section 6 concludes also providing suggestions for further work on the subject.
2 The bioeconomic model
Let us consider a marine ecosystem with two interacting sh species indexed by 1 and 2 with biomass
(or density) measures X1 and X2 respectively, both subject to commercial harvesting. As customary,
we assume that their time evolution is described by a two-dimensional continuous dynamical system
of the form

X1 = X1G1(X1; X2) H1 (X1; X2) (1)

X2 = X2G2(X1; X2) H2 (X1; X2)
where

Xi, i = 1; 2, denote the time derivatives of biomass, Gi specify the natural growth functions
and Hi represent the instantaneous harvesting of the two species.
Concerning the growth functions Gi, they may include dierent kinds of interspecic and in-
traspecic interactions (see e.g. [15], [16], [2], [17]). In the following, we focus on the well known
Rosenzweig-MacArthur prey-predator model (see e.g. [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23]) characterized by
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saturation of predation uptake, described by a Holling type II functional response, given by
G1(X1; X2) = 

1  X1
K

  X2
+X1
; G2(X1; X2) =
X1
+X1
  d (2)
where  is the intrinsic growth rate, K is the environmental carrying capacity of prey population, 
is the maximum uptake rate for predator,  denotes the ratio of biomass conversion (satisfying the
obvious restriction 0 <  < 1), d is the natural death rate of predator and  represents the half-
saturation constant. All these parameters are assumed to be real and positive. Throughout the paper,
we shall consider growth equations (2) such that the asymptotic behavior of the unexploited model
(1) gives rise to coexistence of the two species, i.e. positive biomass values (stationary or oscillatory),
letting available positive stocks of both species for sustainable intake.
In order to model the shery, i.e. the harvesting functions Hi in (1), let us assume that it is a
common-pool resource and N shermen are allowed to land the stocks X1 and X2, and a regulator can
manage the shery in order to mitigate the eect of overexploitation. Besides the benchmark cases of
constant eort imposed by the regulator and unrestricted harvesting of the stocks, the main case we
develop in the paper involves a regulator which establishes 'weak' constraints on the shery; namely,
each sherman must commit himself to harvesting only one kind of sh for a given period of time.
Accordingly, the population of N shermen is partitioned into two groups of exploiters. We denote
by r 2 [0; 1] the fraction of agents harvesting species 1, hence agents in the complementary fraction
(1  r) only catch species 2. Let hi and i be, respectively, the instantaneous biomass intake of species
i and the corresponding instantaneous prot of a representative agent in group i, i = 1; 2.
As for this fraction r, in the following we shall consider both the cases of constant exogenously
imposed r and endogenously updated r = r(t). In the former case, the fraction of shermen allowed
to take a given species is imposed by the authority, according to some economic or social optimum
criteria, whereas in the latter case this fraction is decided by the shermen themselves, who are free
to change the group they belong to over time. The cases of endogenously updated strategies with
continuous and discrete time switchings are then developed in Section 4.
2.1 Harvesting functions
Here we examine the dierent harvesting functions that will be considered in the paper in order to
model dierent exploitation behaviors regarding the two species.
2.1.1 Imposed constant eort
This is the simplest sheries policy, where shermen are allowed to harvest both stocks but a constant
shing eort E is imposed by a central authority, so that the harvesting functions assume the form
(see e.g. [2])
Hi = qiEXi (3)
where qi is a technological coecient and E depends on the total number of vessels (each vessel is
assumed to harvest both species with the same eort). Notice that, in principle, we should assume
that the authority xes a dierent eort level for each species. However, since in this model the catch
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is directly proportional to biomass, we assume that this dierence is included in the specic intake
factor qiE.
2.1.2 Unrestricted harvesting
Here we assume that the N shermen, acting as oligopolists, are all free to harvest both kinds of sh
(preys and predators), whose current total stocks are, respectively, X1 andX2. Since no constraints are
imposed, we assume that agents are all homogeneous. We recall that h1 and h2 denote the quantities
of the two species harvested by each representative agent.
Following [24] and [25], we assume a linear demand system dening the current selling prices of
the two species as
p1 = a1   b1N(h1 + h2); p2 = a2   b2N(h1 + h2) (4)
where ai and bi represent, respectively, the maximum price consumers are willing to pay and the slope
of the demand for species i;  2 [0; 1] is the symmetric degree of substitutability between the two sh
varieties: if  = 0 the two varieties are independent in demand, on the other hand for  = 1 they are
perfect substitutes (we disregard the case  < 0 modeling varieties that are demand complementary).
Many authors (see again [24] and [25]) assume b1 = b2 = b.
Concerning cost functions, as standard in models of sheries we assume quadratic harvesting costs
for both species1, i.e.
Ci (Xi; hi) =
(
i
h2i
Xi
if Xi > 0
0 if Xi = 0
(5)
where i is a technological parameter for catching species i. This cost function can be derived from
a Cobb-Douglas type \production function" with shing eort (labor) and sh biomass (capital) as
production inputs (see e.g. [26], [2]). It captures the fact that it is easier and less expensive to catch
sh if the sh population is large, so that it includes resource stock externalities.
The prot of the representative sherman is
 = [a1   b1N (h1 + h2)]h1 + [a2   b2N (h1 + h2)]h2   1 h
2
1
X1
  2 h
2
2
X2
(6)
As standard in game-theoretic models, each agent makes his/her own choice by considering that
also other agents are prot maximizers. The harvesting quantities hi which maximize the instanta-
neous prot are given by
hi =
aj(bj +Nbi)XiXj   aiXi(bj(1 +N)Xj + 2j)
(bi +Nbj)(bj +Nbi)XiXj2   (bi(1 +N)Xi + 2i)(bj(1 +N)Xj + 2j)
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (7)
In the trivial case of Xi = 0, we set h

i = 0 throughout the paper.
By inserting (7) into (6) the optimal individual prot becomes
 =

b1 +
1
X1

(h1)
2 +

b2 +
2
X2

(h2)
2 + h1h

2 (b1 + b2)
1The adopted notation emphasizes that costs (as well as harvesting and prots) are equal to zero whenever Xi = 0.
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An assumption to get a more tractable algebra consists in letting b = 0, i.e. perfectly elastic
demands with xed prices pi = ai. The assumption of xed prices is often justied by the fact that
there are many substitutes for each species and sh is considered a staple food for most consumers.
With xed prices, individual optimal harvesting and prots read:
hi =
aiXi
2i
;  = 1
h21
X1
+ 2
h22
X1
=
a21X1
41
+
a22X2
42
(8)
Therefore with unrestricted harvesting, total industry catch is Hi = Nh

i .
2.1.3 Restricted harvesting
Here we consider N shermen divided into two groups, say group 1 and 2, such that a sherman
belonging to group i can only harvest sh of species i. Let hi be the actual quantity of species i
harvested by the representative agent of group i. We recall that r denotes the fraction of agents
harvesting species 1. The linear demand system becomes
p1 = a1   b1N(rh1 +  (1  r)h2) (9)
p2 = a2   b2N(rh1 + (1  r)h2)
where the constant ai and  have been dened in Subsection 2.1.2. The prot function for the
representative agent harvesting species i is
i = pihi   Ci(Xi; hi) = [ai   biN (rihi + rjhj)]hi   i h
2
i
Xi
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (10)
where r1 = r, r2 = 1  r and with cost functions (5). The 'optimal' instantaneous harvesting level hi
for species i is
hi =
aiXi(bjXj [1 +Nrj ] + 2j)  ajbiNrjXiXj
(biXi(1 +Nri) + 2i)(bjXj(1 +Nrj) + 2j)  bibjN2rirjXiXj2
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (11)
By inserting (11) into (10), we get optimal individual prots
i =

bi +
i
Xi

(hi )
2 (12)
Also in this case, the assumption of perfectly elastic demands for both stocks ( b = 0) allows us to get
a simpler expression of the individual optimal harvesting and individual prots, given by
hi =
aiXi
2i
; i =
a2iXi
4i
; (13)
and total industry prot
 = N [r1 + (1  r)2] (14)
respectively. Notice that, as expected, the total instantaneous prots are greater in the case of unre-
stricted harvesting (compare (8) and (14)). In order to capture the eects of the dierent harvesting
strategies on the ecosystem as well as the time evolution of prots, we now consider the dynamic
models of the shery system (1) with the dierent harvesting functions obtained in this section.
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3 The non-evolutionary dynamic models
We now consider the general dynamic model (1) with the three dierent harvesting functions proposed
in the previous section, in order to compare the dierent time evolutions of the ecological system and
prots. In particular, in this section, the case of harvesting restricted to one species at a time is
analyzed assuming that the proportion of agents exploiting the two stocks is ex-ante decided by an
authority and held xed, i.e. we analyze a non-evolutionary version of the model. The evolutionary
counterpart is then considered in Section 4.
3.1 The dynamic model with undierentiated constant eort harvesting
We rst analyze the model (1) obtained under the assumption of imposed constant eort E  0,
i.e. with harvesting functions (3). The time evolution of the sh biomasses is thus modelled by the
following system of dierential equations

X1 = X1

1  X1
K

  X1X2
+X1
  q1EX1 (15)

X2 = X2

X1
+X1
  d

  q2EX2
The model is practically the same as the classical Rosenzweig-MacArthur prey-predator model (see
e.g. [18], [19], [27], [28], [29]) with linear extra mortality terms both in prey and predator equations.
So, simply translating the results given in the quoted references we obtain the following dynamic
scenario.
Proposition 1. The dynamical system (15) has three non-negative equilibria: (0; 0),

K( q1E)
 ; 0

;
X1
E
; X2
E

=

 (d+ q2E)
   d  q2E ;

K

(  q1E)K (   d  q2E)   (d+ q2E)
(   d  q2E)2

The equilibrium

K( q1E)
 ; 0

is positive as long as  > q1E and is a saddle point if the coexistence
equilibrium

X1
E
; X2
E

is in the positive orthant. The coexistence equilibrium

X1
E
; X2
E

belongs
to the positive orthant i
 > d+ q2E; and   q1E >  (d+ q2E)
K (   d  q2E) (16)
and it is stable for
(d+ q2E) < K (  q1E) (   d  q2E) <  ( + d+ q2E) (17)
Notice that the second condition in (16) implies that the coexisting equilibrium exists only if  is
suciently higher than q1E. In analogy with the case of unexploited model (see e.g. [22]) the following
bifurcation curves are dened in the parameters' space
K = KT =
(d+ q2E)
(  q1E) (   d  q2E) (transcritical bifurcation curve)
K = KH = KT +

(  q1E) (   d  q2E) (Hopf bifurcation curve) (18)
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Figure 1: (a) Bifurcation curves in the parameters' space (;K) for the prey-predator model without
harvesting (E = 0) and parameters' values:  = 250;  = 100;  = 140; d = 9: The regions bounded by
the bifurcation curves are denoted as region I (predator extinction region), region II (stable coexistence
equilibrium) and region III (oscillatory coexistence along a limit cycle). (b) Time evolution of three
typical trajectories, one for each region. The dotted lines in panel (b) represent the carrying capacity
of the prey.
In Fig. 1, the bifurcation curves in the reference case of no harvesting (i.e. E = 0) are represented,
as well as the regions bounded by them, denoted as region I (predator extinction region), region II
(stable coexistence equilibrium) and region III (oscillatory coexistence along a limit cycle). Three
typical time evolutions, one for each region, are also represented in Fig. 1b. Instead, Fig. 2a exhibits
the same bifurcation curves obtained with E > 0.
3.2 Dynamic shery with unrestricted harvesting
Here we consider the model (1) with harvesting functions (7). Under the assumption b = 0; i.e. xed
prices, the harvesting functions are given in (8) and the model becomes

X1 = X1

1  X1
K

  X1X2
+X1
 N a1X1
21
(19)

X2 = X2

X1
+X1
  d

 N a2X2
22
for which the following results can be proved (see Appendix A).
Proposition 2. The dynamical system (19) has three non-negative equilibrium points, given by
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Figure 2: (a) Bifurcation curves with constant shing eort E1 = 40
a1
21
, E2 = 40
a2
22
, q1 = q2 = 1.
(b) Bifurcation curves with unrestricted harvesting, biological parameters as in Fig. 1 and economic
parameters: 1 = 4; 2 = 6:2; N = 50; a1 = a2 = 10. (c) Bifurcation curves with exploiters split
equally in two groups, i.e. r = 0:5 (xed).
S0 = (0; 0), S1 =

K(21 Na1)
21
; 0

, provided that 21 > Na1, and S2 = (X

1 ; X

2 ) with
X1 = 
22d+Na2
22   22d Na2 and X

2 =
X1 + 
K

(K  X1 ) KN
a1
21

that has non-negative components provided that
 > d+N
a2
22
and 21  Na1 >
21

d+N a222

K

   d N a222

At K(21 Na1)K(21 Na1)+21   d N
a2
22
= 0, i.e. at
K = KfT =
21(d+
Na2
22
)
(21  Na1)

   d  Na222
 (20)
a transcritical bifurcation occurs, at which the equilibrium S2 enters the positive orthant and S1 be-
comes a saddle point, whereas at K (21  Na1)

   d N a222

  21

 + d+N a222

= 0,
i.e. at
K = KfH = K
f
T +
21
(21  Na1)

   d  Na222
 (21)
the equilibrium S2 loses stability through a supercritical Hopf Bifurcation.
3.3 Dynamics with restricted harvesting
Here we consider the model (1) with the harvesting functions of Subsection 2.1.3, where r 2 [0; 1] is
an exogenous parameter. Again, in order to obtain some analytical results, we study the model with
xed prices, i.e. with harvesting functions (13), thus having:
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
X1 = X1

1  X1
K

  X1X2
+X1
  rN a1X1
21
(22)

X2 = X2

X1
+X1
  d

  (1  r)N a2X2
22
The following characterization of equilibrium points holds (see Appendix A for a proof):
Proposition 3. The dynamical system (22) has three non-negative equilibrium points, given
by S0 = (0; 0), S
r
1 =

K(21 rNa1)
21
; 0

and Sr2 = (X
r
1 ; X
r
2), with X
r
1 =


d+(1 r)N a2
22

 d (1 r)N a2
22
, Xr2 =
(+Xr1)

h
  Xr1K   rN a121
i
.
The Equilibrium Sr1 is positive if 21 > rNa1, and S
r
2 is positive provided that  > d +
(1  r)N a222 and Xr1 <
K(21 rNa1)
21
.
Sr2 becomes stable through a transcritical bifurcation at which S
r
1 and S
r
2 exchange stability, and
loses stability through a supercritical Hopf bifurcation; the analytical expressions for bifurcations curves
are given by
K = KrT =
21

d+ (1  r) a2N22

(21  Na1)

   d  (1  r) a2N22
 (Transcritical bifurcation curve) (23)
K = KrH = K
r
T +
21
(21  Na1)

   d  (1  r) a2N22
 (Hopf bifurcation curve) (24)
A graphical representation of the local bifurcation curves obtained is reported in Fig. 2: the central
panel shows the bifurcation curves and the stability regions for the case of unrestricted oligopolistic
competition (Proposition 2), whereas Fig. 2c depicts the same curves and regions for the model
with intake restricted to one species (Proposition 3). Visual inspection reveals that the transcritical
bifurcation curve is shifted down in the latter case, so that the region of coexistence (region II plus
region III) is wider in the latter case.
4 Evolutionary dynamics
In this section and in the next one, we analyze the case where shermen are allowed to choose which
species they prefer to harvest on the basis of the observed prots, i.e. they can switch from a shing
strategy to the one expected to be more protable. Thus, r is no longer a xed parameter but it
becomes an endogenous dynamic variable.
We start our study with the case of continuous time replicator dynamics (see [30], [31], [14]),
modelled through the following nonlinear three-dimensional system of ODE

X1 = X1G1(X1; X2) Nr(t)h1 (X1; X2) (25)

X2 = X2G2(X1; X2) N(1  r(t))h2 (X1; X2)

r = r [1   (r1 + (1  r)2)] = r(1  r) [1   2]
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where hi , i = 1; 2 are the instantaneous intakes of species i given in (11), which maximize expected the
instantaneous prot i, so that the harvesting terms in (1) become H1 = Nrh

1 and H2 = N (1  r)h2
respectively.
However, in real systems the authority imposes that shermen have to commit themselves to the
decided strategy for a given period of time s > 0 (switching time). Thus we consider a more realistic
description of this type of endogenous evolutionary adjustment mechanism through an hybrid dynamic
model with discrete-time (or impulsive) switching. Fishermen decide these updates on the basis of
observed prots, thus giving rise to endogenous evolutionary dynamics, according to the replicator
equation in discrete time (see [30], [31], [7]). This leads to a dynamic model with continuous-time
growth and harvesting of the sh species and discrete (or pulse) strategy switching. Thus the last
equation in (25) is replaced by
r(t) =
(
r(t  s) 1r(t s)1+[1 r(t s)]2 if ts =

t
s

r
 
t
s

s

otherwise
where i =
tR
t s
i () d
s
(26)
where bxc is the largest integer not greater than x (i.e. the oor of x) and i represents the average
prot of shermen that harvested species i in the previous period. Notice that in the limiting case
s! 0, equation (26) becomes the replicator equation with continuous-time switching (25).
4.1 Prot driven replicator dynamics in continuous time
In this case the dynamic model is given by a system of three ordinary dierential equations: the usual
two equations of biomass dynamics in (1) and the third one of the replicator dynamics in (25), which
regulates the time evolution of the fraction of shermen choosing to harvest species 1, where hi and
i are given, respectively, by (11) and (12). Notice that the set r 2 [0; 1] is a trapping region, that
is, if the initial condition r(0) 2 [0; 1], then r(t) 2 [0; 1] for all values of t  0. Moreover, r = 0 and
r = 1 are trapping surfaces, that is, if r(0) = 0 then r(t) = 0 for all t  0; the analogous property
holds for r = 1. From the replicator equation in (25), we have that the equilibria of the system must
be located in the trapping regions r = 1, r = 0 or in the isoprot surface 1 = 2. However, due
to the complicated algebraic expressions of hi and 

i , an analysis of the conditions for existence and
stability of the equilibrium points is quite dicult in the general case. Therefore, we rely on numerical
simulations in section 5 to explore the dynamics of this three-dimensional dynamical system.
In the remainder of this subsection, we consider the simpler case of constant prices, i.e. b1 = b2 = 0.
In this case, according to (13), the dynamic model is described by the following system of ODEs:

X1 = X1

1  X1
K

  X1X2
+X1
  rN a1X1
21
(27)

X2 = X2

X1
+X1
  d

  (1  r)N a2X2
22

r = r(1  r)

a21
41
X1   a
2
2
42
X2

The analysis of the equilibria of the model are given below.
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Proposition 4. The system of ordinary dierential equations (27) admits the following equilibria:
Se0 = (0; 0; r) ,with r 2 [0; 1];
Se1 = (K; 0; 0);
Se2 =

K(21 Na1)
21
; 0; 1

, with 21 > Na1;
Se3 = (X
e
1 ; X
e
2 ; 0) ; where X
e
1 =
(Na2+2d2)
22( d) Na2 and X
e
2 =
(+Xe1)

h
1  Xe1K
i
;
Se4 =
 eXe1 ; eXe2 ; 1, where eXe1 = d d and eXe2 = (+ eXe1) h  eXe1K  N a121 i;
Se5 =
 bXe1 ; bXe2 ; br ; where bXe1 =  2d2+(1 br)Na222 2d2 (1 br)Na2 and bXe2 = 2a211a22 bXe1 , where br can assume at
most two values inside (0; 1) given by the real solutions (if any) of a second degree algebraic equation.
The global extinction equilibria Se0 are stable if 21 < rNa1; the equilibrium S
e
1, with predator's
extinction and no prey harvesting, is always unstable; the equilibrium Se2, with predator's extinction and
all shermen harvesting preys, is unstable if K (21  Na1) (   d) > 2d1; the equilibrium Se3,
with coexisting preys and predators and no prey harvesting, is stable if 1 < 2,  2

Na2+2d2
22
;+1

and K 2

0; (Na2+22(d+))Na2+22(d )

; the equilibrium Se4, with coexisting preys and predators and all
shermen harvesting preys, is stable if 1 > 2, and K 2

0; (d+) d
i
or, when K 2

(d+)
 d ;+1

,
for d (d(K+) ( K))K(d ) <
Na1
21
; the equilibria (if any) Se5 where both prey and predators are harvested,
is unstable if
2a21
bXe1
1a22(+ bXe1)2  K whereas, if the reverse inequality holds, it is possible to nd suitable
parameter values such that Se5 is stable.
Proof and details are in Appendix B.
It is worth noticing that the most interesting equilibrium is Se5, as it is characterized by harvesting
of both stocks (so that consumers can found both sh species in the market) with a given proportion
dened by the isoprot condition X2 =
2a21
1a22
X1. The isoprot condition has a clear economic meaning,
and the parameters involved can be easily controlled by properly tuning cost and price parameters.
4.2 Discrete time impulsive switching based on prot driven replicator dynamics
We nally consider the model (26) characterized by stocks dynamics and harvesting activities in
continuous time with strategy switches at discrete decision-driven times; the length s of the time
interval between decisions is the only form of regulatory policy in the model. In particular, we deal
with the dynamical system (26) where hi and 

i are given, respectively, in (11) and (12). Assuming
again constant prices, i.e. b = 0, the dynamical system reads

X1 = X1

1  X1
K

  X1X2
+X1
  rN a1X1
21
(28)

X2 = X2

X1
+X1
  d

  (1  r)N a2X2
22
r(t) =
(
r(t  s)

a21X1
41

41
r(t s)a21X1
+ 42
[1 r(t s)]a22X2

if ts =

t
s

r
 
t
s

s

otherwise
Of course, any equilibrium point for the evolutionary model in continuous time (see Proposition 4)
is also an equilibrium for the hybrid system (28), because the rst and the second dynamic equations
are identical, and the replicator dynamics in discrete time has the same equilibrium conditions being
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r(t) = r(t  s) for r = 0, r = 1 or 1 = 2. However, the converse is not necessarily true. In fact, in
the hybrid model an equilibrium is characterized by the condition that the average prots of the two
strategies over the interval s are equal, but instantaneous prots could dier over time.
Some insights on the dynamics of model (28) and the comparison with the other benchmarks are
given in next section. As we shall see, r(t) becomes a piecewise-constant function, like an endogenously
driven bang-bang parameter whose discontinuous jumps occur at discrete times and leads to sudden
switch among dierent dynamic scenarios, which is a typical behavior of hybrid systems, see e.g. [32],
[13], [33].
5 Numerical Simulations
In this section we propose the results of some numerical explorations of the dierent models described in
the previous sections, in order to compare the dierent exploitation behaviors both from the biological
and the economic point of view. All the numerical simulations shown in this section are essentially
obtained by using a reference constellation of parameters, and only the two bifurcation parameters
K and  are varied. However, the dynamic scenarios observed are representative of the behaviors we
observed in many more cases.
A typical trajectory of the prey-predator model without harvesting is depicted in Fig. 3a, where
the biological parameters are set as follows:  = 250, K = 140,  = 140,  = 100,  = 0:6, d = 9.
According to Proposition 1, an oscillatory convergence to the coexistence equilibrium

X1
E
;X2
E

is obtained. Now let us suppose that the Fishing Authority decides to give 50 licences for shing
both preys and predators according to the unrestricted oligopolistic competition described in section
2.1.2, with economic parameters 1 = 4, 2 = 6:2,  = 0:5, a1 = a2 = 10, b1 = b2 = 0. In Fig. 3b
the corresponding trajectory is shown, which leads to the equilibrium S1 where predators are extinct,
according to Proposition 2. Similarly, if the Fishing Authority decides to give 25 licences for shing the
prey only and 25 licences for shing the predator only, i.e. N = 50 and r = 0:5 (xed) for preventing
overexploitation, then the system converges to the predators extinction equilibrium Sr1 , as determined
in Proposition 3 and shown in Fig. 3c. Of course the value of r in this numerical simulation is
not optimally chosen by solving a suitable optimal control problem, but we just assumed the rough
rule of thumb of dividing the shermen into two groups of equal number. Instead, Figs. 3d,e show
the time evolutions of preys and predators when the parameter r is not xed but it is endogenously
chosen by shermen on the basis of the prot-driven evolutionary mechanism in continuous time and
discrete time respectively, as described in section 4. It is worth specifying that Figs. 3d,e represent
the projection on the two-dimensional space (X1; X2) of trajectories generated by three-dimensional
dynamical systems where the third dynamical variable r(t) is modeled with a discrete switching time
s = 3 in Fig. 3e, and continuous time evolution, i.e. s ! 0, in Fig. 3d. The two trajectories exhibit
a similar asymptotic behavior, even if their transient portions are dierent. Indeed, they converge to
the same biological coexistence equilibrium Se5 (see Proposition 4), with the same nal share of agents
shing species 1, given by r ' 0:664564. However, in the discrete case the dynamic is characterized
by "jumps", which are evident in Fig. 4f, where the evolution of r(t) is shown versus time along
the trajectory of Fig. 3e (compare Figs. 4e,f). This example conrms that for some parameter
13
0 646
0
1045
No
Harvesting
X1
Panel (a)
X2
0 646
0
1045
Unrestricted
Harvesting
X1
Panel (b)
X2
0 646
0
1045
Restricted
Harvesting
X1
Panel (c)
X2
0 646
0
1045
Continuous Endogenous
Group Choice
X1
Panel (d)
X2
0 646
0
1045
Discrete Endogenous
Group Choice
X1
Panel (e)
X2
Figure 3: Trajectories in the phase space (X1; X2) with parameters as in Fig. 1 and k = 140;  = 0:6;
1 = 4; 2 = 6:2; N = 50; a1 = a2 = 10; b1 = b2 = 0 and initial condition X1(0) = 300, X2(0) = 485,
r(0) = 0:5. (a) Rosenzweig-MacArthur prey-predator model without harvesting. (b) Unrestricted
harvesting. (c) Restricted harvesting with imposed r = 0:5. (d) Endogenous r(t) in continuous time.
(e) Hybrid model with r(t) in discrete time. In all the gures gray points represent unstable equilibria
and gray points with a hole represent stable equilibria for the continuous evolutionary model.
settings the model with continuous-time switching may provide a good benchmark for understanding
the dynamical properties of the more realistic, but also more involved, hybrid system. In both cases
the state variable r converges to the same equilibrium value, with the only dierence in the speed of
convergence, which is much higher in the continuous switching case. For the shermen this means
less prots in case of discrete adjustment mechanism during the initial transient. However, in the
two examples the same biomass of preys and predators as well as the same prots are obtained in
the long run. Figs. 4a,b,c,d, where the time evolutions of total prots computed along the same
trajectories of Figs. 3b,c,d,e are represented, show that the model with the endogenous adaptive
switching mechanism could also exhibit good performances.
In this specic example, the highest prots are obtained under unrestricted harvesting, so that
unrestricted harvesting would seam to be a good practice for the shermen. However, here unrestricted
harvesting leads to overexploitation, as it reduces the carrying capacity of the prey so that predators
become extinct, see again Fig. 3b. On the contrary, the endogenous pulse switching mechanism is
able to ensure a good compromise between prots and sustainable exploitation of both species.
In Fig. 5, we increase the value of the carrying capacity to K = 600, so that the model without
harvesting presents persistent oscillations along a stable limit cycle, as described in Section 3.1 (see
Fig. 5a). This means that the prey-predator ecosystem is characterized by oversupply of nutrients
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Figure 4: Versus-time representation of total prots along the trajectories of the model with: (a)
Unrestricted harvesting; (b) Restricted harvesting with imposed r = 0:5; (c) Endogenous r(t) in
continuous time; (d) Hybrid model with r(t) in discrete time. Versus time evolution of r(t) in: (e)
continuous time. (f) discrete time (all parameters as in Fig. 3).
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Figure 5: Trajectories in the phase space (X1; X2) with initial condition and parameters as in Fig. 3
but K = 600. (a) Rosenzweig-MacArthur prey-predator model without harvesting. (b) Unrestricted
harvesting. (c) Restricted harvesting with imposed r = 0:5. (d) Endogenous r(t) in continuous time.
(e) Hybrid model with r(t) in discrete time.
at the bottom of the food chain that leads to persistent oscillations (according to the "paradox of
enrichment" see e.g. [34], [27], [35], [36]). In the long run, the model with unrestricted harvesting (Fig.
5b) leads to predators' extinction and with imposed r = 0:5 (Fig. 5c) it has persistent oscillations.
On the contrary, with the same initial conditions and parameter values, both models with endogenous
switching in continuous time (Fig. 5d) and in discrete time (Fig. 5e) converge to a stable equilibrium
where preys and predators coexist in the stationary state denoted by Se5 in Proposition 4. We notice
that in this case the evolutionary model with endogenous switching helps to stabilize the preys-
predators coexistence equilibrium, i.e. it helps avoiding the paradox of enrichment. Therefore, from a
practical point of view, while the denition of an optimal value of r is not an easy task, as it requires
time, money and farsightedness, the evolutionary switching mechanism described in this paper seems
to bring good results, although exploiters are allowed to adopt short-run optimizing strategies, which
would lead to overexploitation or extinction when totally unregulated.
The simulations depicted in Fig. 6 are obtained with K = 600 and the other parameter as before.
The initial condition of the system is taken suciently close to the inner equilibrium Se4. According
to Proposition 4, the border equilibrium Se4 =
 eXe1 ; eXe2 ; 1 has already lost its stability through
a supercritical Hopf bifurcation since K > KH =
21(d+)
(21 Na1)( d) ' 219:74, being KH the Hopf
bifurcation curve for that equilibrium, according to Proposition4. It follows that for suitable initial
conditions, the system with replicator dynamics in continuous time (27) converges to a stable limit
cycle, see Fig. 6d. Therefore, in this case the model in continuous time admits the coexistence of two
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Figure 6: Trajectories in the phase space (X1; X2) with parameters as in Fig. 5 but initial condition
X1(0) = 60, X2(0) = 60, r(0) = 0:5 (a) Rosenzweig-MacArthur prey-predator model without harvest-
ing. (b) Unrestricted harvesting. (c) Restricted harvesting with imposed r = 0:5. (d) Endogenous
r(t) in continuous time. (e) Hybrid model with r(t) in discrete time.
stable attractors, the stable steady state Se5 and the stable limit cycle bifurcating from S
e
4. However, in
the hybrid case we always detected the convergence to the inner equilibrium, no matter what the initial
condition is. It proves that in some cases the presence of pulse dynamics could stabilize the system.
This stabilizing eect can also be stressed through the inspection of the basins of attraction, shown
in Fig. 7. In Fig. 7a the white region represents the basin of attraction of equilibrium Se5 and the
black region is the basin of attraction of the limit cycle depicted in Fig. 6d. For the hybrid system,
the generic trajectory with initial condition in the square (X1; X2) 2 (0:1; 600)  (0:1; 600) always
converges to the inner equilibrium Se5. With respect to the third dynamic variable, all the basins here
shown are obtained with initial condition r = 0:5: However, other simulations not reported here show
similar scenarios also for dierent initial values of r.
With all parameters as in Fig. 6, except K = 650, we obtain the example shown in Fig. 8. In Fig.
8a two coexisting stable limit cycles are created through supercritical Hopf bifurcations of Se4 (black
curve) and Se5 (gray curve) in the model with continuous replicator dynamics (27). Notice that no
stable equilibrium exists in this case for the system (27) according to Proposition 4. This case gives
us the opportunity to discuss some similarities and dierences between the continuous and the hybrid
model. So far, the numerical analysis has shown that the dynamics of the hybrid model converged
to the inner equilibrium whenever Se5 was locally asymptotically stable for the evolutionary system in
continuous time. In addition, Fig. 8b shows that the stability of the inner equilibrium Se5 in the hybrid
model may hold even when it is not a stable in the model with continuous time switching (27). In
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Figure 7: Basin of attractions with initial conditions (X1(0), X2(0)) in the square (0:1; 600)(0:1; 600)
and with initial r = 0:5 for the model with endogenous r(t) in: (a) continuous time. (b) discrete time.
Parameters as in Figs. 5 and 6. White region is the basin of attraction of the inner equilibrium Se5;
Black region is the basin of attraction of the stable closed invariant orbit in Fig. 6d.
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orbit appears through a supercritical Hopf bifurcation of Se5; the stable black one appears through a
supercritical Hopf bifurcation of Se4. (b) Hybrid model with r(t) in discrete time.
Fig. 8a the trajectory of the model with continuous switching is plotted without a transient to better
emphasize the two stable limit cycles. The two initial conditions taken in the basins of attraction of
the two dierent limit cycles are, respectively, X1(0) = 300, X2(0) = 485, r(0) = 0:5 and X1(0) = 60,
X2(0) = 60, r(0) = 0:5. In Fig. 8b, the whole trajectory (i.e. with the transitory part) of the hybrid
dynamical system is plotted.2
Another way to compare the dierent dynamical systems is the numerical study of the two-
parameters bifurcation diagram in the space (;K).3 In Fig. 9a,b we show these diagrams for the cases
of continuous and discrete evolutionary dynamics. The parameter constellation is the same as in Fig.
1a and Figs. 2a,c, so that a direct comparison can be carried out4. The two-parameters bifurcation
diagrams in Fig. 2 and Fig. 9 emphasize that in all the considered dynamical systems, there are three
possible long-run behaviors: 1) convergence to a stable border equilibrium, characterized by preda-
tor extinction or one-species harvesting (grey region); 2) convergence to a stable inner equilibrium,
characterized by coexistence and harvesting of both species (white region); and 3) convergence to an
attractor with persistent oscillations dynamics, characterized by coexistence and harvesting of the two
species (black region). The bifurcation diagrams give numerical evidence that the dynamical systems
without harvesting and the one with evolutionary switching have several analogies. Indeed, the trans-
critical bifurcation curves, marking the transition from grey to white areas, look very similar for these
2For graphical reasons in Fig. 8b we have only shown the trajectory starting from X1 = 300; X2 = 485; r = 0:5,
although also the trajectory with the other initial condition converges to the inner equilibrium.
3The choice of K as bifurcation parameter is standard for the Rosenzweig-MacArthur model (see e.g. [27]) while  is
chosen for convenience. The same analysis with other parameters may also be useful, but it would lead to quite similar
results.
4Notice that, apart from the bifurcation parameters  and K, the remaining parameters are xed as in Fig. 3. The
same set of parameters is employed also in all the other gures of this paper, with the exception of Fig.10 where b1;2 6= 0.
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Figure 9: Bifurcation diagrams in the parameters space (;K) 2 (0:5; 1)  (1; 700): white region
represents couple of parameters such that the system converges to the stable inner equilibrium Se5; for
parameters in the black region there is persistent cyclic behavior along a stable limit cycle around Se5;
in the gray areas Se5 is not feasible. (a) continuous replicator dynamics. (b) Hybrid model.
two models. This means that, if there are suitable ecological conditions for the stable coexistence of
the two stocks, then it is highly probable that these conditions also ensure the coexistence in case
of harvesting with evolutionary switching. Moreover, from the bifurcation diagrams, it is clear that
persistent oscillations are more common for the natural model without harvesting than in the evolu-
tionary model, because the region of stationary coexistence (i.e. stability of the positive equilibrium)
is larger for the model with harvesting under evolutionary switching. In other words, the evolutionary
shery mechanism modeled in this paper can even enhance stability in cases where the unexploited
resource exhibits persistent oscillatory dynamics, as it may reduce the destabilizations caused by an
excess of nutrients available to the preys, i.e. an increase of K. Notice that, in the case of unrestricted
harvesting (Fig. 2a), the grey region extends over almost the entire parameter space, thus leading to
a low probability that predators will survive in the long run, much lower than in the other scenarios,
according to the paradigm of the tragedy of the commons. The two parameters bifurcation diagrams
of Fig. 9 also suggest that, in general, the two proposed evolutionary models have dierent stability
regions. On the contrary to what one would expect, the pulse dynamics model may have a stabilizing
eect. In fact, in the case under consideration, there are pairs of parameter values (K; ) for which the
inner equilibrium is unstable for the continuous time evolutionary model and stable for the discrete
time evolutionary model. In this particular case, these pairs are located near the left upper corners of
Figs. 9a,b. Notice that this is precisely what we have already observed in the numerical simulations
shown in Fig. 8.
Up to now, we only considered cases with perfectly elastic demand for the two species. In the
following example we relax this assumption in order to understand the possible eect of non-constant
prices in the dynamics of the models. For the sake of comparison, all the parameters are set as in Fig.
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Figure 10: Trajectories in the phase space (X1; X2) with initial condition and parameters as in Fig. 3
but b1 = b2 = 0:01 and  = 1=2 (a) Rosenzweig-MacArthur prey-predator model without harvesting.
(b) Unrestricted harvesting. (c) Restricted harvesting with imposed r = 0:5. (d) Endogenous r(t) with
continuous time replicator dynamics. (e) Hybrid model.
3, but b = 0:01. The dierent dynamic behaviors are evident by comparing Figs. 3 and 10. In this
case, the higher is the quantity of sh in the market, the lower is its selling price, so that this eect
reduces the overexploitation and the long-run dynamics settle to an inner equilibrium in all the cases.
In conclusion, the hybrid model exhibits in most cases convergence to the inner equilibrium, despite
a strange transient dynamics. However, also attractors dierent from xed points can be present, as
indicated in the two parameters bifurcation diagram of Fig. 9b. A plausible explanation of the
stabilizing eect observed in the numerical simulations is based on the role played by s, i.e. the
length of time after which shermen are allowed to change their harvesting strategies according to
past prots. As s! 0, the hybrid model tends to the continuous one and shermen react immediately
to changes in instantaneous harvesting strategy prots. As s increases the shermen decisions occur
with a higher degree of inertia. Moreover, they base their decision upon a more sophisticated time-
structure information about past prots, i.e. mobile time averages of prots observed in the past, and
this has a stabilizing role as well.
6 Some conclusions and further developments
In this paper a hybrid dynamical system is proposed to model a shery where two species in prey-
predator relationship are harvested by a population of shermen who are allowed to catch only one of
the two species at a time, and to change the caught variety at discrete time pulses, according to a prot-
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driven replicator dynamics. However, the dynamic equations describing the growth and interaction
of the two sh species are always in continuous time. The analytical and numerical results show that
this type of evolutionary mechanism may lead to a good compromise between prot maximization and
resource conservation thanks to an evolutionary self-regulation based on cost and price externalities.
In fact, the reduction of biomass of one species leads to increasing landing costs and it consequently
favours the endogenous switching to the more abundant species. Moreover, severe overshing of one
species causes decreasing prices and consequently decreasing prots.
The employed prey-predator model, namely logistic growth and Holling type II function response,
is simple and widely employed in the literature. Nevertheless, introducing harvesting with impulsive
evolutionary switching in discrete time makes the model quite complicated to be studied analytically.
For this reason, some simpler benchmark cases, with xed prices or continuous time switching, have
also been developed here. Although these benchmarks may seem quite unrealistic, they constitute a
useful guide, even a sort of basic foundation on which the (mainly numerical) analysis of the more
realistic model with variable market prices and impulsive strategy switching can be built upon.
In the paper we have carried out several comparisons between continuous time and discrete time
(or impulsive) switching according to the prot-driven replicator dynamics. Our numerical results
show that in some cases the region of stability of the inner equilibrium is larger in the hybrid system
than in the continuous-time model. Other remarkable features of the hybrid system are related to
the possibility of reducing long run oscillation dynamics as well as to avoiding the occurrence of
bistability. This seems to be in contrast with some results in the literature stressing the fact that
discrete replicator dynamics generated oscillatory behaviors (see e.g. [9]). However in our case we
have a hybrid model where the discrete replicator switching is embedded in an underlying model in
continuous time. Moreover, the switching is decided according to a moving average of prots, and this
has a stabilizing eects because it introduces a form of inertia.
From the point of view of population dynamics, the endogenous switching mechanism, in which
shermen decide the variety to catch on the basis of their prots, attenuates some negative eects
of unrestricted harvesting. In fact, in some cases if the dynamics of the unexploited species converge
to the stable coexistence equilibrium, then it is highly probable that coexistence is achieved with
harvesting strategy switching (in continuous or discrete time), thus signicantly reducing the negative
eects of exploitation. Another surprising characteristic of this endogenous switching is the reduction
of the "oscillatory eect" due to oversupply of food. In fact, it is well known that, in a food-chain
population model, the presence of self-sustained oscillations means oversupply of nutrients. In [27]
some practical rules are given to reduce oscillations caused by overabundance of food at the bottom
of the food chain.
The exercise carried out here oers glimpse into the interesting properties of myopic and adaptive
harvesting mechanisms driven by endogenous evolutionary processes. However this is just a starting
point for further and deeper analysis. There are several aspects of the model that deserve to be
explored more deeply. For example, the variable r, i.e. the fraction of shermen harvesting a given
sh stock, is assumed to unconstrainedly range in the interval [0; 1], where 0 and 1 are always equilibria.
When r converges to 0 or 1, one of the two species is no longer harvested and consequently it is not
available in the market. This could be an acceptable outcome only if the two species of sh are perfect
22
substitute in consumers tastes (corresponding to the case  = 1 in our model). Otherwise consumers
may be heavily penalized by such equilibrium strategies. This issue will be addressed in future work,
for example by introducing constraints on the dynamics of r. The research could be extended in other
dierent directions as well. First of all, it would be interesting to compare the results obtained here
with those where an optimal fraction r is computed according to an optimal control problem, in which
a social welfare function is maximized over time. Moreover, the stability analysis for the model with
continuous evolutionary switching mechanism may be extended to provide indications on the behavior
of the hybrid dynamical system in the long run.
7 Appendix A
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2
To investigate the stability properties of the equilibria by linearization, we consider the Jacobian
matrix of (19):
J =
"
  2X1K   X2(+X1)2  
Na1
21
  X1+X1
X2
(+X1)
2
X1
+X1
  d  a2N22
#
At the extinction equilibrium S0 the Jacobian matrix is diagonal:
J (S0) =
"
  Na121 0
0  d  a2N22
#
with eigenvalues 1 =   Na121 and 2 =  d  a2N22 < 0. Therefore S0 is a stable node for 21 < Na1,
i.e. when the total shing eort level exceeds the intrinsic growth rate of the prey population. Instead,
S0 is a saddle point, and S1 becomes positive (through a transcritical bifurcation) when 21 > Na1.
From the triangular structure of the Jacobian matrix in S1 =
 
X1; 0

J (S1) =
"
 + Na121  
X1
+X1
0 K(21 Na1)21+K(21 Na1)   d 
a2N
22
#
it is easy to see that S1 is a stable node when  >
Na1
21
and K(21 Na1)21+K(21 Na1)   d 
a2N
22
< 0. Instead,
when the interior equilibrium S2 enters the positive orthant the boundary equilibrium S1 becomes a
saddle, with stable manifold along the X1 axis and unstable manifold transverse to it, via transcritical
bifurcation.
The Jacobian of the system in S2 is:
J (S2) =
2664

d+N
a2
22

(21 Na1)K

 d N a2
22

 21

+d+N
a2
22

2K1

 d N a2
22
   X1+X1
X2
(+X1 )
2 0
3775
When (21  Na1)K

   d N a222

  21

d+N a222

decreases across zero, S2 merges with
S1 and then it exits the positive orthant, and S1 becomes stable through a transcritical bifurcation.
Instead, if (21  Na1)K

   d N a222

  21

 + d+N a222

< 0 the equilibrium is stable,
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while, when this inequality is reversed, it becomes an unstable focus through a supercritical Hopf
bifurcation5 after which an attractive limit cycle appears around it.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The Jacobian matrix of (22)
J =
"
  2X1K   X2(+X1)2   r
Na1
21
  X1+X1
X2
(+X1)
2
X1
+X1
  d  (1  r) a2N22
#
computed at the global extinction equilibrium S0 = (0; 0) becomes
J (S0) =
"
  rNa121 0
0  d  (1  r) a2N22
#
so the eigenvalues are both negative if 21 < rNa1. If 21 > rNa1 then S0 is a saddle point and S
r
1
is positive. From
J (Sr1) =
"
 + rNa121  
X1
+X1
0 K(21 Na1)21+K(21 Na1)   d  (1  r)
a2N
22
#
it is plain to see that Sr1 is a stable node whenever the elements in the principal diagonal of J (S
r
1) are
negative.
If the interior equilibrium Sr2 is positive, then the boundary equilibrium S
r
1 is a saddle. From
J (Sr2) =
2664

d+(1 r)N a2
22
h
(21 rNa1)K

 d (1 r)N a2
22

 21
i
21K

 d (1 r)N a2
22
   Xi1
+Xi1
Xi2
(+Xi1 )
2 0
3775
it is easy to see that Sr2 is stable for (21  rNa1)K

   d  (1  r)N a222

 21

 + d+ (1  r)N a222

<
0 and unstable otherwise, with stability loss occurring via a supercritical Hopf bifurcation, as it can
be seen numerically (see footnote at the end of the proof of Proposition 2).
It is worth noticing that for

   d  (1  r) a2N22

K (21  Na1) 21

d+ (1  r) a2N22

= 0,
Sr2 merges with S
r
1 and when the left hand side is negative the equilibrium S
r
2 is no longer in the positive
orthant and the equilibrium Sr1 becomes stable through a transcritical bifurcation.
8 Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 4
Existence of equilibria.
Equilibrium points are the solutions of the algebraic system
5A rigorous proof of the supercritical or subcritical nature of Hopf bifurcation requires a center manifold reduction and
the evaluation of higher order derivatives, up to the third order (see e.g. [37]). This is rather tedious in a two-dimensional
system, and we claim numerical evidence in order to ascertain the nature of such bifurcations.
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X1



1  X1
K

  X2
+X1
  rN a1
21

= 0
X2

X1
+X1
  d  (1  r)N a2
22

= 0 (29)
r(1  r)

a21
41
X1   a
2
2
42
X2

= 0
from which it is straightforward to obtain the equilibria Se0; S
e
1; S
e
2; S
e
3; S
e
4.
As for the equilibrium Se5, when r 2 (0; 1), the third equation in (29) is satised when X2 = 2a
2
1
1a22
X1
so that the rst and second equations become
X1
+X1

  X1
K

(+X1)  a
2
12X1
a221
  rNa1
21
(+X1)

= 0
2a
2
1
1a22
X1

X1
+X1
  d  (1  r) Na2
22

= 0
From the second one we have X1(r) =
(2d2+(1 r)Na2)
22 2d2 (1 r)Na2 , so that the rst equation in (29) can be
written as
(Na2(1  r) + 2d2)
2a22K1( a2N(1  r)  22(d  ))2

Ar2 +Br + C

= 0; (30)
with
A = a1a
2
2KN
2 (a1   a2)
B = a2N

a1K f 2a1(a2N + 2d2   2) + a2[a2N + 22(d  )]g+ 2a22(K + )1
	
C = a21K(a2N + 2d2)[a2N + 22(d  )]  2a221[(K + )(a2N + 2d2)  2K2]
We observe that one root of equation (30) never belongs to the interval [0; 1], being r = 1+ 2d2Na2 > 1
and so an inner equilibrium is a root of the second degree equation in square brackets in (30). Specic
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with r 2 (0; 1) can be given. For instance, assuming that
a1 > a2; then the second degree equations has always two real solutions r

1 < r

2 with lim
2!0+
r1 = 1 , so
that, by continuity, a suciently low cost coecient 2 ensures the existence of at least one equilibrium
with r 2 (0; 1).
Stability analysis
The Jacobian matrix
J (X1; X2; r) =
2664
  rNa121  
2
KX1   X2(+X1)2  
X1
+x1
 Na1X121
X2
(+X1)
2
X1
+X1
  d  (1 r)Na222 Na222 X2
r(1 r)a21
41
  r(1 r)a2242 (1  2r)

a21
41
X1   a
2
2
42
X2

3775
at the global extinction equilibrium Se0 = (0; 0; r) becomes:
J (Se0) =
264  
rNa1
21
0 0
0  d  (1 r)Na222 0
r(1 r)a21
41
  r(1 r)a2242 0
375
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which is a triangular matrix with a vanishing eigenvalue along the trapping line of equilibria (r
axis), stable along the X1 axis provided that, as usual, 21 < rNa1. Instead, at the equilibrium
Se1 = (K; 0; 0) with predator's extinction and no prey harvesting, the Jacobian matrix is triangular
again
J (Se1) =
264    
K
+K  Na1K21
0 K+K   d  Na222 0
0 0
a21
41
K
375
but the equilibrium is always unstable due to the third eigenvalue which is always positive (unstable
along a direction transverse to X1 axis, due to the time evolution of r that has the tendency to
increase in a neighborhood of the equilibrium). At the equilibrium Se2 =

K
21
(21  Na1) ; 0; 1

with 21 > Na1, where predator is extinct and all shermen harvest preys, the Jacobian is triangular
again and two eigenvalues are always negative. Therefore Se2 is unstable if the natural conditions for
predators' survival
X1
+X1
> d hold true, i.e. K (21  Na1) (   d) > 2d1, otherwise it is stable.
At the equilibrium Se3 = (X
e
1 ; X
e
2 ; 0), with coexisting preys and predators and no prey harvesting, the
Jacobian matrix reads
J (Se3) =
26664


1  2Xe1K

  Xe2
(+Xe1)
2   X
e
1
+Xe1
 N a1Xe121
Xe2
(+Xe1)
2 0 N
a2Xe2
22
0 0
a21
41
Xe1   a
2
2
42
Xe2
37775 (31)
from which it is straightforward to observe that
a21
41
Xe1   a
2
2
42
Xe2 is an eigenvalue, and the other two
eigenvalues are solutions of the equation 2   J11   J12J21 = 0, where Jij is the entry at row i-th
and column j-th of J (Se3). So, being  J12J21 > 0, the conditions for the asymptotic stability of Se3
become
a21
41
Xe1  
a22
42
Xe2 < 0


1  2X
e
1
K

  X
e
2
(+Xe1)
2 < 0
which can be restated, substituting the equilibrium values as
 2

Na2 + 2d2
22
;+1

and K 2

0;
(Na2 + 22(d+ ))
22(   d) Na2

For  2

Na2+2d2
22
;+1

and K = (Na2+22(d+))22( d) Na2 , the characteristic equation has one negative
root and two complex conjugate roots with zero real part, i.e. the equilibrium can undergo a Hopf
bifurcation if nondegeneracy conditions are satised. A similar analysis holds for the equilibrium
Se4 =
 eXe1 ; eXe2 ; 1.
Finally, for the equilibria (if any) Se5 =
 bXe1 ; bXe2 ; br where both prey and predators are harvested,
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substituting the equilibria conditions in the Jacobian matrix we get
J (Se5) =
266664
bXe1  2a21 bXe1
1a22(+ bXe1)2   K

   bXe1
+ bXe1  N a1
bXe1
21
2a21
bXe1
1a22(+ bXe1)2 0 N
a21
bXe1
21a2br(1  br) a2141  br(1  br) a2242 0
377775
By applying the Routh-Hurwitz criterion to J (Se5), we can deduce that no stable equilibrium
with r 2 (0; 1) exists whenever 2a21 bXe1
1a22(+ bXe1)2  K , whereas, when the reverse inequality holds, i.e.
when the biomass equilibrium level bXe1 belongs to a given interval, stability of the inner equilibrium
can be achieved for specic parameter values. The equilibrium can undergo a Hopf bifurcation for
J21 (J12J11 + J13J32) + J31 (J13J11 + J12J23) = 0.
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